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Assessing Metacognition and 
Self-Regulated Learning 
Paul R. Pintrich 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor 
Christopher A. Wolters 
University of Houston 
Gail P. Baxter 
Educational Testing Service 
In this chapter we provide an overview of the conceptual and 
methodological issues involved in developing and evaluating mea-
sures of metacognition and self-regulated learning. Our goal is to 
suggest a general framework for thinking about these assessments-
a framework that will help generate questions and guide future 
research and development efforts. Broadly speaking, we see the main 
issue in assessing metacognition and self-regulated learning as one of 
construct validity. Of critical importance are the conceptual or 
theoretical definitions of these constructs and the adequacy of the 
empirical evidence offered to justify or support interpretations of test 
scores obtained from instruments designed to measure them. 
In speaking to this issue of construct validity, we organize our 
chapter into four main sections. First, we review the various theoreti-
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cal and conceptual models of metacognition and self-regulated learn-
ing and propose three general components of metacognition and self-
regulation that will guide our discussion in subsequent sections. 
Second, we briefly describe a set of criteria proposed by Messick 
(1989) for investigating construct validity and suggest a set of guiding 
questions and general issues to consider in evaluating measures of 
metacognition and self-regulated learning. Third, we discuss in some 
detail several measures for assessing metacognition and self-regu-
lated learning in light of the empirical evidence available to address 
issues of the construct validity of these measures. In the fourth and 
final section, we draw some conclusions about current measures of 
metacognition and self-regulated learning, suggest some directions 
for future research, and raise some issues that merit consideration in 
the development and evaluation of valid measures of metacognition. 
COMPONENTS OF METACOGNITION AND SELF-REGULATED 
LEARN ING 
There is general agreement that metacognition can be divided 
into two general constructs termed metacognitive knowledge and 
metacognitive control and regulation. Some researchers have pro-
posed that the term metacognition be reserved for the construct of 
metacognitive knowledge and that the term not include metacognitive 
control and regulation activities (Paris & Winograd, 1990). Others 
have proposed that monitoring and control are two different aspects 
of meta cognition and need to be separated conceptually and function-
ally from each other and from metacognitive knowledge (Nelson & 
Narens, 1990). In this chapter, we recognize the importance of 
distinguishing between these different components and organize our 
discussion around three general components of metacognition: (a) 
metacognitive knowledge, (b) metacognitive judgments and monitor-
ing, and (c) self-regulation and control of cognition. Of course, as in 
any model of metacognition and self-regulation, these three general 
components are interdependent, but for the purpose of exposition, we 
discuss them separately. 
It should be noted that there is confusion in the literature regard-
ing the use of the terms meta cognition and self-regulated learning. 
Metacognition is the "older" term defined and used in the late 1970s 
and into the 1980s by developmental and cognitive psychologists (see 
Flavell, 1979). Much of the research on meta cognition during this 
time focused on students' metacognitive knowledge about different 
types of memory and cognitive strategies and only later were issues 
2. ASSESSMENT OF METACOGNITION 45 
of control and regulation of cognition included (Brown, Bransford, 
Ferrara, & Campione, 1983). Beginning in the mid 1980s and continu-
ing into the 1990s the construct of self-regulated learning was pro-
posed by educational and developmental psychologists to refer to the 
various ways individuals monitor, control, and regulate their learning 
(see Schunk & Zimmerman, 1994; Zimmerman, 1986; Zimmerman & 
Schunk, 1989). In this research, self-regulated learning includes 
monitoring, controlling, and regulating cognition and monitoring, 
controlling, and regulating other factors that can influence learning 
such as motivation, volition, effort, and the self-system. Most of the 
models of self-regulated learning assume that the processes of moni-
toring, controlling, and regulating are related to, if not dependent on, 
metacognitive knowledge about the self and cognition (Garcia & 
Pintrich, 1994). As such, self-regulated learning is the more global 
and inclusive construct and subsumes metacognition and 
metacognitive knowledge. Nevertheless, we will refer to certain 
aspects of knowledge and monitoring as metacognitive because they 
are focused specifically on knowledge and monitoring of cognition. 
We now turn to a description of the three general components of 
metacognition and self-regulated learning and the various ways they 
have been conceptualized in the research (see Table 1). 
Metacognitive Knowledge 
Metacognitive knowledge includes students' declarative, proce-
dural, and conditional knowledge about cognition, cognitive strate-
gies, and task variables that influence cognition (Alexander, Schallert, 
& Hare, 1991; Flavell, 1979). In some models, metacognitive knowl-
edge is labeled as metacognitive awareness, but we believe that 
awareness connotes a more "on-line," "in-the-moment," or conscious 
experience and we prefer to consider that an aspect of meta cognitive 
judgment and monitoring. We reserve the term metacognitive knowl-
edge for knowledge about cognition and assume it is similar in many 
ways to other kinds of knowledge in long-term memory that indi-
viduals can have about any topic such as geography, automobiles, 
furniture, or mathematics. In this sense, metacognitive knowledge 
may be more "static" and statable than monitoring and regulation 
(Schraw & Moshman, 1995); that is, individuals can tell you if they 
know something or not, such as knowing the state capital of Nebraska 
or knowing the definition of words (see Tobias, this volume). In 
contrast, a more "on-line" measure of metacognitive monitoring 
would involve students' judgments of whether they are comprehend-
46 PINTRICHIWOL TERS/BAXTER 
ing the text or learning something about the Great Plains as they read 
a geography textbook. 
In Flavell's classic (1979) paper on meta cognition he proposed 
that metacognitive knowledge included knowledge of the person, 
task, and strategy variables or factors that can influence cognition. In 
the person category he included beliefs about the self in terms of 
intraindividual differences (e.g., knowing that one is better at memory 
tasks than problem-solving tasks) as well as interindividual differ-
ences (e.g., knowing that one is better at memory tasks than a friend) 
and universals of cognition (e.g., knowing that one has to pay close 
attention to something in order to learn it). In our conceptualization 
of metacognition, we believe that the person variables, except for the 
universals of cognition, are better seen as motivational constructs 
(Garcia & Pintrich, 1994). They certainly represent knowledge of the 
self, and in that sense are metacognitive. However, because they 
involve the self, they are "hot" cognitions, not" cold" cognitions about 
task and strategy variables, and as such will not be discussed much in 
this chapter. 
Knowledge about the task and knowledge about the strategy 
variables that influence cognition are the more traditional 
metacognitive knowledge constructs. Task variables include knowl-
edge about how task variations can influence cognition. For example, 
if there is more information provided in a question or a test, then it 
will generally be more easily solved than when there is little informa-
tion provided. Most students corne to understand this general idea 
and it becomes part of their metacognitive knowledge about task 
features. Other examples include knowing that some tasks, or the 
goals for the task, are more or less difficult, like trying to remember 
the gist of a story versus remembering the story verbatim (Flavell, 
1979). . 
Knowledge of strategy variables includes all the knowledge indi-
viduals can acquire about various procedures and strategies for 
cognition including memorizing, thinking, reasoning, problem solv-
ing, planning, studying, reading, writing, etc. This is the area that has 
seen the most research and is probably the most familiar category of 
meta cognitive knowledge. Knowing that rehearsal can help in recall-
ing a telephone number, or that organizational and elaboration strat-
egies can help in the memory and comprehension of text information, 
are examples of strategy knowledge. In addition, metacognitive 
knowledge has been further broken down into declarative, proce-
dural, and conditional metacognitive knowledge (Alexander et al., 
1991; Paris, Lipson, & Wixson, 1983; Schraw & Moshrnan, 1995). 
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Table 1. Three General Components of Metacognition and Self-Regulated 
Learning 
I. METACOGNITIVE KNOWLEDGE 
A. Knowledge of cognition and cognitive strategies-knowledge 
about the universals of cognition 
1) Declarative knowledge of what different types of 
strategies are available for memory, thinking, prob-
lem-solving, etc. 
2) Procedural knowledge of how to use and enact differ-
ent cognitive strategies 
3) Conditional knowledge of when and why to use dif-
ferent cognitive strategies 
B. Knowledge of tasks and contexts and how they can influence 
cognition 
C. Knowledge of self-comparative knowledge of intra-
individual and interindividual strengths and weakness 
as a learner or thinker; better seen as motivational not 
metacognitive self-knowledge 
II. METACOGNITIVE JUDGMENTS AND MONITORING 
A. Task difficulty or ease of learning judgments (EOL)-making 
an assessment of how easy or difficult a learning task will 
be to perform 
B. Learning and comprehension monitoring or judgments of learn-
ing (JOL) -monitoring comprehension of learning 
C. Feeling of knowing (FOK)-having the experience or "aware-
ness" of knowing something, but being unable to recall it 
completely 
D. Confidence judgments-making a judgment of the correct-
ness or appropriateness of the response. 
III. SELF-REGULATION AND CONTROL 
A. Planning activities-setting goals for learning, time use, 
and performance 
B. Strategy selection and use-making decisions about which 
strategies to use for a task, or when to changing strategies 
while performing a task 
C. Allocation of resources-control and regulation of time use, 
effort, pace of learning and performance 
D. Volitional control-control and regulation of motivation, 
emotion, and environment 
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Declarative knowledge of cognition is the knowledge of the what of 
cognition and includes knowledge of the different cognitive strategies 
such as rehearsal or elaboration that can be used for learning. Proce-
dural knowledge includes knowing how to perform and use the 
various cognitive strategies. It may not be enough to know that there 
are elaboration strategies like summarizing and paraphrasing, it is 
important to know how to use these strategies effectively. Finally, 
conditional knowledge includes knowing when and why to use the 
various cognitive strategies. For example, elaboration strategies may 
be appropriate in some contexts for some types of tasks (learning from 
text); other strategies such as rehearsal may be more appropriate for 
different tasks or different goals (trying to remember a telephone 
number). This type of conditional knowledge is important for the 
flexible and adaptive use of various cognitive strategies. 
Metacognitive Judgments and Monitoring 
Unlike the static nature of metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive 
judgments and monitoring are more process-related and reflect 
metacognitive awareness and ongoing metacognitive activities indi-
viduals may engage in as they perform a task. These activities can 
include four general metacognitive processes: (a) task difficulty or 
ease of learning judgments (EOL), (b) learning and comprehension 
monitoring or judgments of learning (JOL) , (c) feeling of knowing 
(FOK), and (d) confidence judgments (see Table 1). 
Individuals can make determinations of the difficulty level of the 
task such as how hard it will be to remember or learn the material, or 
in Nelson and Narens's (1990) framework what they call ease of 
learning judgments (EOL). These EOL judgments draw on both 
metacognitive knowledge of the task and metacognitive knowledge 
of the self in terms of past performance on the task. Further, these 
EOL judgments are assumed to occur in the acquisition phase of 
learning before the learner begins a task and therefore should be 
viewed separately from judgments of learning or readiness for a test 
(e.g., Hunter-Blanks, Ghatala, Pressley, & Levin, 1988). In the class-
room context, students could make these EOL judgments as the 
teacher introduces a lesson or assigns a worksheet, project, or paper. 
A second type of metacognitive judgment or monitoring activity 
involves judgments of learning and comprehension monitoring. These 
judgments may manifest themselves in a number of activities such as 
individuals becoming aware that they do not understand something 
they just read or heard or becoming aware that they are reading too 
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quickly or slowly given the text and their goals. Judgments of 
learning also would be made as students actively monitor their 
reading comprehension by asking themselves questions. Judgments 
of learning also could be made when students try to decide if they are 
ready to take a test on the material they have just read and studied. 
Pressley and Afflerbach (1995) provide a detailed listing of monitor-
ing activities that individuals can engage in while reading. These 
types of monitoring activities are called judgments of learning (JOLs) 
in the Nelson and Narens (1990) meta memory framework. JOLs 
occur during the acquisition and retention phases in their model of 
memory. In each case individuals make predictions about which 
items on a memory task they have learned and whether they will be 
able to recall them in the future . In a reading comprehension task, this 
would involve readers, as they are in the process of reading, making 
some assessment of whether they will be able to recall information 
from the text at a later point in time (e.g., Pressley, Snyder, Levin, 
Murray, & Ghatala, 1987b). In the classroom context, besides reading 
comprehension, JOLs could involve a student making a judgment of 
her comprehension of a lecture as the instructor is delivering it or 
whether she could recall the lecture information for a test at a later 
point in time. 
A third type of metacognitive awareness process is termed the 
feeling-of-knowing or FOK (Nelson & Narens, 1990; Koriat, 1993). A 
typical instance of FOK occurs when a person cannot recall something 
when called upon to do so, but knows he knows it, or at least has a 
strong feeling that he knows it. In colloquial terms, this experience is 
often called the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon and occurs as a person 
is attempting to recall something. In the Nelson and Narens (1990) 
framework, FOKs are made after failure to recall an item and involve 
a determination of whether the currently unrecallable item will be 
recognized or recalled by the individual at a later point in time. Koriat 
(1993) points out that there is evidence that FOK judgments are better 
than chance predictors of future recall performance, albeit not a 
perfect correlate. In a reading comprehension task, FOKs would 
involve the awareness of reading something in the past and having 
some understanding of it, but not being able to recall it on demand. 
FOKs in the classroom context could involve having some recall of the 
teacher lecturing on the material or the class discussing it, but not 
being able to recall it on the exam. 
A fourth type of metacognitive judgment concerns the confidence 
an individual has in their retrieved answer on a memory task, a 
reading comprehension task, or even on a classroom exam. This 
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confidence judgment is assumed to come after some retrieval of 
information and some output response or behavior has been enacted 
(Nelson & Narens, 1990). For example, students might be given a text 
to read, asked to answer some questions about it, and then asked to 
judge the confidence they have in their answers (Pressley, Ghatala, 
Woloshyn, & Pirie, 1990). Another type of confidence judgment has 
been used in error detection studies. Students are given a text to read 
that has errors in it and they are asked to find contradictions or errors 
in the text. After they have finished reading the text and reporting on 
the errors they found, students are asked to rate their comprehension 
of the text and rate their performance in detecting the errors (Baker, 
1989b). These judgments of comprehension and error detection 
performance are assumed to reflect some metacognitive awareness 
about the correctness of performance and the calibration of these 
confidence judgments to actual performance is an important aspect of 
metacognitive judgment and monitoring. 
Self-Regulation and Control 
The types of activities that individuals engage in to adapt and 
change their cognition or behavior are known collectively as self-
regulation and control. In this sense, this component is more of a 
process, ongoing activity, like meta.~ognitive judgments and monitor-
ing, than a static entity like metacognitive knowledge. In most 
models of metacognition and self-regulated learning, control and 
regulation activities are assumed to be dependent on, or at least 
strongly related to, metacognitive monitoring activities, although 
metacognitive control and monitoring are conceived as separate pro-
cesses (Nelson & Narens, 1990; Zimmerman, 1989, 1994). In this 
chapter we focus on measures of control and regulation of cognition 
that could be more narrowly labeled metacognitive control and self-
regulation. Other aspects of self-regulated learning including motiva-
tion, effort, volition, goals, and the self-system, can be "controlled" 
and therefore are included in our framework of self-regulated learn-
ing (see Table 1). However, because control and regulation of these 
components have not been studied as much as control and regulation 
of cognition, they are not discussed in as much detail in the third 
section of this chapter on construct validity of the instruments to 
measure metacognition and self-regulated learning. 
In the Pressley and Afflerbach (1995) model of constructively 
responsive reading, monitoring activities include monitoring of com-
prehension as well as a variety of decisions to change reading strate-
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gies and behavior such as varying the speed of reading, rereading, or 
taking notes on reading material. This model is based on data from 
in-depth verbal protocol analyses of reading behavior where it is clear 
that monitoring and regulating activities often occur at the same time. 
Likewise in our self-report data on metacognition and self-regulation, 
it has not been possible to separate empirically cognitive monitoring 
from control and regulation of cognition (Pintrich & De Groot, 1990; 
Pintrich, Smith, Garcia, & McKeachie, 1993). Despite the empirical 
difficulties demonstrated by these studies, conceptually it is possible 
to distinguish between monitoring activities that involve assessing 
comprehension, learning, or performance, and regulating activities 
that involve changing cognition or behavior to bring them in line with 
personal goals or task demands. Further, there are a number of 
different activities that can be considered part of the various control 
and regulation processes. We organize our conceptual discussion 
around the four general categories of planning, strategy selection and 
use, resource allocation, and volitional control (see Table 1). 
Planning is an important aspect of regula ting cognition and 
behavior and involves the setting of goals that can be used to guide 
cognition in general and monitoring in particular (Pressley & 
Afflerbach, 1995; Schunk, 1994; Zimmerman, 1989; Zimmerman & 
Martinez-Pons, 1986, 1988). The goal acts as a criterion against which 
to assess and monitor cognition, just as the temperature setting of a 
thermostat guides the operation of the thermostat and heating/ 
cooling system. For example, if one student has a goal of mastering 
the text material as opposed to another student who just wants to 
complete the reading assignment, then the first student will monitor 
and regulate her reading cognition in a way that can lead to deep 
understanding (e.g., use self-questioning or reread parts that are not 
understood) . In contrast, the second student may just proceed to read 
through the material and, when at the end of the selection, be satisfied 
that the goal of completing the reading has been reached. Of course, 
planning is most often assumed to occur before starting a task, but 
goal-setting can actually occur at any point during performance. 
Learners may begin a task by setting specific goals for learning, goals 
for time use, and goals for eventual performance, but all of these can 
be adjusted and changed at any time during task performance. 
One of the central aspects of the control and regulation of cogni-
tion is the actual selection and use of various cognitive strategies for 
memory, learning, reasoning, problem solving, etc. Numerous stud-
ies have shown that the selection of appropriate cognitive strategies 
can have a positive influence on learning and performance. These 
52 PINTRICHIWOL TERS/BAXTER 
cognitive strategies range from the simple memory strategies very 
young children through adults use to help them remember (Schneider 
& Pressley, 1989) to sophisticated strategies that individuals have for 
reading (Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995), mathematics (Schoenfeld, 1992), 
writing (Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1987), problem solving, and reason-
ing (see Baron, 1994; Nisbett, 1993). Although the use of various 
strategies is probably deemed more "cognitive" than metacognitive, 
the decision to use them is an aspect of meta cognitive control and 
regulation as is the decision to stop using them or to switch from one 
strategy type to another. 
The third aspect of self-regulation and control that we include in 
our framework is the allocation of resources such as time, overall 
effort, and pace of learning. These resources may not be strictly 
cognitive because they do not involve specific cognitive strategies, but 
the control and regulation of these resources can be an important 
aspect of self-regulated learning (Nelson & Narens, 1990; Pintrich, 
Smith et al., 1993; Zimmerman, 1989, 1994). Obviously, a greater 
amount of time spent studying a list of words to be memorized or a 
set of text materials for an exam should result in improved learning 
and performance. Moreover, the amount of overall effort put into a 
task can reflect overall time use, the intensity of study including the 
use of more appropriate cognitive strategies, or more attention and 
concentration on the task without the use of better strategies. Finally, 
the pace of learning, how fast individuals perform the various sub tasks 
of the overall task, is an important feature that self-regulated learners 
can control. 
A fourth category of self-regulation and control is what we have 
called volitional control. Although some theorists have termed all of 
the meta cognitive control and regulation activities as volitional con-
trol (d. Como, 1993; Kuhl, 1985, 1992), we reserve this term for the 
control of emotion, motivation, and the general environment. As 
learners engage in tasks, their cognition, emotions, and motivational 
beliefs are activated. Consequently, the learners' ability to control 
and regulate their emotions can play an important part in their 
learning (Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995). In the same manner, motiva-
tional beliefs can have a dramatic influence on cognition, learning, 
and performance (Pintrich, Marx, & Boyle, 1993; Pintrich & Schrauben, 
1992) and attempts to regulate or control motivation could result in 
improved learning. Both Como (1993) and Kuhl (1985; 1992) have 
suggested that individuals' ability to control their environment (e.g., 
arrange for quiet space for studying away from distractions) is an 
important aspect of self-regulation. Although the control of motiva-
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tion and emotion are important aspects of self-regulated learning, we 
do not discuss in much detail the various instruments to assess them 
in this chapter because of our focus on the cognitive components of 
self-regulated learning, not the motivational components. 
Taken together, planning, strategy selection, resource allocation, 
and volitional control comprise four important aspects of self-regula-
tion and control. In combination with metacognitive judgments and 
monitoring, they make up the "on-line" process-oriented aspects of 
metacognition and self-regulated learning. The "static" component of 
metacognition, metacognitive knowledge, once activated in a situa-
tion, is an important resource that is drawn upon by learners as they 
monitor and control their own learning. In proposing this three 
component model of metacognitive knowledge, monitoring, and self-
regulation and control, and their corresponding subcomponents, we 
lay a conceptual framework for examining the empirical evidence for 
the construct validity of our measures. We turn now to a discussion 
of construct validity. 
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING CONSTRUCT VALIDITY AND 
RELEVANCE/UTILITY OF A MEASURE 
One of the fundamental issues in evaluating assessment instru-
ments purporting to measure metacognition and self-regulated learn-
ing is that of construct validity. Historically, construct validity was 
conceived as one of three essential aspects of validity termed con-
struct, criterion (predictive and concurrent), and content validity. 
Each aspect was defined to some extent with respect to the purpose 
of the measure. Content validity was of primary importance for 
achievement tests where issues of the overlap between test items and 
a subject-matter domain were addressed by professional judgment. 
Tests designed to predict future performance (e.g., success in college) 
or tests designed to replace an existing measure, relied on criterion-
related validity evidence typically in the form of data from correla-
tions or regressions where the test score (e.g., SAT score) was related 
to the" criterion" (e.g., success in college as measured by undergradu-
ate GPA). Construct validity in the form of correlational, experimen-
tal, or other forms of data analysis argued for the presence of latent or 
unobservable traits such as anxiety or intelligence. 
Recent conceptions reject this traditional three-pronged approach 
in favor of a "unified" validity theory with construct validity as the 
overarching issue and all other "types" of validity subsumed under it 
(Cronbach, 1989; Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; Messick, 1989; Shepard, 
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1993). In his comprehensive treatise of validity, Messick (1989) 
restated the centrality of construct validity and drew attention to its 
relations to the value and consequences of test interpretation and use. 
In an effort to clarify these relations, he proposed a four quadrant 
model of validity that crosses the nature of the empirical evidence on 
the test and the potential consequences of the test data with how the 
test is interpreted and used (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Messick's (1989) Conceptualization of Construct Validity. 
Test Interpretation Test Use 
Evidential Basis CellI Cell 2 
Construct Validity Construct Validity 
1) Content + 
2) Substantive 
3) Structural Relevance IU tili ty 
4) External 
5) Generality of 
Meaning 
Consequential Basis Cell 3 Cell 4 
Value Implications Social Implications 
In CellI, Messick (1989) considers a number of specific types of 
evidence that can be offered to support test score interpretations. 
Collectively, he terms these different types of evidence as construct 
validity. Essentially, construct validity involves a determination of 
how well the instrument produces scores that avoid two basic mea-
surement problems: (a) construct underrepresentation or not measur-
ing all relevant aspects of the construct and (b) construct irrelevant 
variance or measuring other constructs, not just the target construct. 
Moving across the row, Cell 2 considers evidence required for test 
score use and includes not only construct validity but relevance and 
utility of the scores as well. 
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In the bottom two cells in Table 2, Messick has placed concerns 
about the consequences of the uses of test scores. In terms of test score 
interpretation, Cell 3, labeled value implications, concerns how the 
construct is defined theoretically and conceptually and the ways in 
which this theoretical framework reflects underlying societal values 
or ideologies. In Cell 4, Messick considers the social benefits and costs 
of using the test scores. For example, intelligence tests and achieve-
ment tests are often used to classify children for special services or for 
selection and placement into different academic tracks and each of 
these decisions has a number of social costs associated with it. Given 
that most measures of metacognition or self-regulated learning are 
not used in this manner, we focus our comments on the first row in 
Figure 1 and consider issues of construct validity and relevance/ 
utility of measures of metacognition and self-regulated learning. In 
what follows, we describe each more fully, noting where appropriate 
similarities and differences between Messick's formulation and the 
writings of others (e.g., Linn, Baker, & Dunbar, 1991; Shepard, 1993). 
Messick (1989) proposes five general components of construct 
validity that merit consideration under the heading evidential basis 
for test score interpretation. These are content, substantive, struc-
tural, external, and generality of meaning. These five components are 
interdependent and although it is difficult to draw sharp distinctions 
or bOlmdaries between them, we discuss them separately. 
Content Component. This component is concerned with the rel-
evance and representativeness of the content coverage of the assess-
ment tool in relation to the domain of interest (Messick, 1989). The 
basic guiding question is: Are the items on the test representative of 
the domain? In achievement testing this concerns how well the 
content of the test reflects the content of the domain. Linn et al. (1991) 
suggest that there are three important aspects that should be consid-
ered in examining content validity: (a) domain specification, (b) 
relevance and meaningfulness of the tasks, and (c) representativeness 
of the content. 
Domain specification concerns assumptions that the test has impor-
tant content on it. For example, would the content on the test be 
considered important by most individuals in the field? Relevance and 
meaningfulness of the tasks concerns the assumption that instructional 
relevance stems from students being asked to do tasks that are as 
meaningful, relevant, and authentic as possible. Although this aspect 
may not be crucial for paper-and-pencil tests, this is especially impor-
tant for performance assessments where students are often asked to 
engage in extended tasks or solve complex problems that demand 
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sustained thinking and reasoning. Finally, the issue of representative-
ness of content concerns the comprehensiveness of the content cover-
age of the test relative to the subject-matter domain. For example, in 
constructing a science achievement test, one should consider the degree 
of overlap between the content included on the test and the various 
domains and important concepts students have learned in science. 
In terms of metacognition and self-regulated learning, content 
coverage and representativeness are important issues when consider-
ing measures of metacognitive knowledge. Metacognitive knowl-
edge can include knowledge of strategies and conditional knowledge 
of when and why to use these strategies. Given that there are probably 
many different strategies for learning in the domains of literacy, math-
ematics, science, and social studies, there will be different domains of 
metacognitive knowledge. Accordingly, assessments of metacognitive 
knowledge must be examined in terms of their content coverage for a 
particular domain. The issue of representativeness may not be as 
important if only one domain is under consideration (e.g., reading) 
unless the measure is assumed to be a general measure of metacognitive 
knowledge but only assesses metacognition for reading words. 
Metacognitive monitoring and self-regulation and control are usu-
ally assumed to be general, content-free processes. Consequently, 
issues of content representativeness are of less importance for these 
assessments than for measures of metacognitive knowledge. 
Substantive Component. Whereas the content component concerns 
the relation between the test items and the larger content domain 
from which the items are sampled, the substantive component refers 
to the internal relations between the data generated from the items 
and the construct theory. The basic guiding question is: Are the 
response patterns on the test consistent with the theory of the con-
struct? In particular, Messick (1989) notes that items on the test as 
well as individuals' responses to these items should exemplify the 
construct being measured and not other constructs. Further, items 
that ostensibly measure a different construct should not be related to 
the test items of the targeted construct. In achievement testing, for 
example, the items on a science achievement test should reflect to a 
large extent acquired knowledge in science, not general intelligence or 
general reading ability. The same logic applies to measures of 
metacognition. For example, measures of metacognitive monitoring 
and awareness should assess monitoring and not other constructs 
such as verbal ability, prior knowledge, or general intelligence (Pressley 
& Ghatala, 1990). Accordingly, a measure of metacognitive monitor-
ing that is dependent on the learner's verbal fluency and ability to 
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articulate their thinking and awareness may be introducing construct-
irrelevant variance into the measure. 
Structural Component. This component of construct validity con-
cerns the relations between the scoring system used and the theoreti-
cal model of the construct. The guiding question is: Do the scores on 
the test and the scoring system reflect the complexities of the con-
struct as expressed in the theoretical model? Generally, the relations 
between items on a test-how they are scored and then summed, 
combined, or kept separate-should reflect the same relations as 
those expressed in the theoretical model of the construct. A single 
total score from a test implies that the construct is unitary; a number 
of different subscales or scores implies a differentiated construct; a 
combination of one total score with several subscales implies a hier-
archical model of the construct under consideration. 
In achievement testing, separate subscores for different aspects of 
mathematics such as geometry, algebra, and trigonometry implies 
that there are different domains of expertise and separate scores are 
necessary to capture this complexity. On the other hand, one total 
score assumes that there is an overall general mathematical expertise 
construct. Of course, it is possible to have a conceptual model that 
underscores the utility of having scores that express domain-specific-
ity as well as general expertise in mathematics. In terms of measures 
of self-regulation and control, if a model proposes a general construct 
as well as the four subprocesses of planning, strategy selection, 
resource allocation, and volitional control, then there may be a ratio-
nale for having one general self-regulation score and four subscores 
corresponding to the four subprocesses. 
Another issue that is subsumed under the dimension of structural 
validity concerns the interpretation of scores in terms of normative 
versus ipsative models and criterion-referenced versus norm-refer-
enced models (Messick, 1989). The normative-ipsative distinction 
represents the measurement version of the nomothetic-idiographic 
distinction made in psychology and education. Normative models 
are concerned with how individuals differ with respect to some 
variable or construct, allowing for comparisons between individuals. 
In contrast, ipsative models order scores on some set of attributes or 
variables for each individual allowing for intraindividual compari-
sons of the relative strengths or weaknesses across attributes (Messick, 
1989). In a similar fashion, norm-referenced scoring models highlight 
the distribution of scores and allow for comparisons between indi-
viduals on the construct. For example, intelligence as a theoretical 
construct is usually conceptualized in a normative fashion and IQ 
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scores are usually scaled to facilitate interpretation of an individual's 
score relative to the population distribution of IQ scores. In contrast, 
criterion-referenced scoring models allow for the comparison of an 
individual's score to some standard and individuals are judged in 
relation to that standard, not with respect to how others performed 
(e.g., driving test). 
In terms of measures of metacognition and self-regulated learn-
ing, the Learning and Study Skills Inventory or LASSI (Weinstein, 
Schulte, & Palmer, 1987; Weinstein, Zimmerman, & Palmer, 1988) 
uses a norm-referenced system so that students' responses can be 
compared against a normative sample. In this case, there is an 
underlying theoretical assumption that students' scores are some-
what general and stable across situations, allowing for normative 
comparisons. Other measures such as the Motivated Strategies for 
Learning Questionnaire or MSLQ (Pintrich & De Groot, 1990; Pintrich, 
Smith, et al., 1993) or the Self-Regulated Learning Interview Schedule or 
SRLIS (Zimmerman & Martinez-Pons, 1986, 1988) do not use norms. 
These measures reflect a theoretical assumption that students' responses 
may vary as a function of the task, situation, course, or school context, 
thereby rendering normative comparison groups less useful. 
External Component. This component of construct validity asks 
the basic guiding question: "What is the nature of the ·relations 
between and among various measures and the construct of interes t?" 
Evidence may come from correlational studies of the pattern of 
relations among measures that purport to measure similar or different 
constructs with similar or different methods (d. Campbell & Fiske, 
1959). In addition to these multitrait multimethod studies, evidence 
may come from an examination of the actual and theoretically pre-
dicted relations between measures of different constructs. Also 
known as nomological validity, the issue is one of fit between theory 
and observed relations between tests scores and other measures of the 
construct. 
In achievement testing, this might involve the collection of data to 
demonstrate how well the test scores relate to the grades students 
receive from teachers or how long they have been in school or how 
many courses they have taken in that domain and their performance 
in those courses. At the same time, scores on the achievement test 
might be compared to other general ability measures (intelligence) 
and the data should show modera te positive relations given that 
achievement and intelligence are usually conceptualized as separate 
constructs, albeit our theories predict they will be positively related. 
In terms of metacognition, if meta cognitive monitoring is assumed to 
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be an important component of skilled reading, then measures of 
metacognitive monitoring should be positively related to other mea-
sures of reading performance such as reading achievement test scores, 
teachers rating or grades for reading, and measures of reading com-
prehension. 
Generality of Construct Meaning. The guiding question for this 
component asks how generalizable the scores are across different 
populations (e.g., males and females; different ethnic groups), do-
mains (e.g., mathematics and reading), tasks, settings, and time. In 
terms of population generalizability, the issue is whether the assess-
ment data from different groups of shldents can be scored and 
interpreted in the same way. Differential performance of various 
populations of students (differing by gender, ethnicity, etc.) has 
always been a concern in achievement tes ting . Recently, 
generalizability has been cited as a primary limiting factor in the use 
of performance assessments-as a replacement or supplement to 40-
item multiple-choice tests common in educational measurement (e.g., 
Linn et al., 1991; Shavelson, Baxter, & Gao, 1993). For measures of 
metacognition and self-regulated learning there is a grea t deal of 
evidence to suggest that metacognition and self-regulated learning 
change with age, both in level and quality, and assessment instru-
ments must take this into consideration . Further, consideration must 
be given to the consistency of measures across groups varying in 
gender, ethnicity / culture, or socioeconomic status (SES). 
Also included under this component are issues of how the assess-
ment data generalize across domains and tasks (see Linn et al., 1991). 
For example, in terms of domain specificity, does a science perfor-
mance assessment score for solving a circuits problem generalize to 
other aspects of science performance in earth science or biology? In 
terms of task specificity, does the score on a paper-and-pencil mea-
sure of students' knowledge of circuits correspond to their perfor-
mance on a hands-on performance assessment on the same content 
(Baxter & Shavelson, 1994; Gao, Shavelson, Brennan, & Baxter, 1996). 
This issue of domain and task generalizability is one of the major 
lmresolved issues in our theories of meta cognition and self-regulated 
learning and consequently as well with our assessment procedures. 
Empirical studies are mute with respect to the rela tion between a 
person's metacognitive monitoring score on a reading comprehension 
task and her metacognitive monitoring score on a mathematics prob-
lem-solving task. High correlations may support a domain-general 
theory whereas low correlations may support a domain-specific inter-
pretation. Further, inconsistent results with different methods of 
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assessing metacognition within a domain such as think-alouds, cloze 
procedures, or multiple-choice questionnaires may arise from construct 
relevant or irrelevant variance. Finally, in terms of temporal 
generalizability, for the same tasks in the same domain, there should be 
some consistency across time in individuals' performance, at least 
within a restricted range of time where development or learning oppor-
tunities are minimal (cf. Ruiz-Primo, Baxter, & Shavelson, 1993). 
Issues of domain, task, and time generalizability are more or 
less important depending on the theoretical stance adopted re-
garding the situational nature of metacognition and self-regulated 
learning. If the conceptual model assumes that all cognition and 
behavior are always and mainly situational, then there is no 
expectation that there will be much consistency across domains, 
tasks, or time. Consequently, variations in scores across these 
contexts are viewed positively, or at least as non-problematic. At 
the other end of the continuum, if the conceptual model assumes 
that metacognition is a stable personal "trait" of the individual, 
then there should be a fairly high level of consistency across 
contexts and deviations from consistency are viewed as problem-
atic for the theory and the assessment instrument. 
Relevance and Utility Concerns in Test Use. Besides the more 
technical aspects of construct validity, Messick (1989) suggests that 
the meaning, relevance, and utility of a measure must be considered 
once the test is prepared for actual use. Linn et al. (1991) suggest that 
for performance assessments, utility concerns the purpose of the mea-
sure, issues of cost and efficiency, and ease of use. In terms of purpose, 
a distinction can be made between measures of metacognition and self-
regulated learning designed primarily for research purposes (i.e., to 
understand and analyze the various components of metacognition and 
self-regulation) and those used to improve practice (i.e., to gauge 
general levels of student metacognition and self-regulation in the 
classroom or for diagnostic purposes). Some methods, such as think-
aloud protocols, may be more easily used in the laboratory or con-
trolled settings such as one-to-one interviews that take place in 
schools, but outside the classroom. Other methods, such as question-
naires or self-reports, can be used in whole group settings such as 
classrooms without too much disruption to established routines. 
Regardless of the purpose for which the method was designed, each 
varies in terms of ease of use and cost. Self-report questionnaires are 
relatively easy and inexpensive to administer and score in terms of 
labor and time; think-alouds and interviews require extended periods 
of time and trained personnel for both administration and scoring. 
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CONSTRUCT VALIDITY OF MEASURES OF METACOGNITION 
AND SELF-REGULATED LEARNING 
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A number of different instruments for assessing students' 
metacognition have been developed. In this section we discuss 
several of these instruments in light of our conceptual framework for 
metacognition and self-regulated learning and Messick's proposed 
framework for assessing construct validity. In particular, we focus on 
construct validity and issues of relevance and utility described above. 
Consistent with the three-component model of meta cognition and 
self-regulated learning described in the first section of this chapter, we 
consider first measures of metacognitive knowledge, then measures 
of metacognitive monitoring, and finally measures of control and self-
regulation. For each type of measure, we report relevant empirical 
studies that bear on issues of construct validity. Our purpose is to 
illustrate the problems and the accomplishments associated with 
es tablishing evidence of construct validity for measures of 
metacognition and self-regulated learning. In doing so, we set aside 
a comprehensive review of all measures and corresponding empirical 
work in favor of attention to selected measures that exemplify key 
issues in evaluating assessments of metacognition and self-regulated 
learning. 
Measures of Metacognitive Knowledge 
Because the knowledge component of metacognition is much like 
other static knowledge stored in long-term memory, measures to 
assess it can look quite similar to standard tests of subject-matter 
knowledge. For example, the Index of Reading Awareness (IRA), 
developed by Paris and his colleagues, is a multiple-choice question-
naire designed to measure metacognitive knowledge in the domain of 
reading comprehension (Jacobs & Paris, 1987; Paris & Jacobs, 1984; 
Paris & Myers, 1981). The 20-item instrument, designed for use with 
elementary school children, consists of 5 items in each of four sections: 
(a) self-knowledge and task knowledge about reading (evaluation), 
(b) knowledge of planning and skimming (planning), (c) knowledge 
about changing and adjusting reading behaviors (regulation), and (d) 
knowledge of when one might use different reading strategies (con-
ditional knowledge). 
In taking the IRA, students are posed a question and asked to 
choose one of the three possible responses. An example of a regula-
tion item is: "What do you do if you come to a word and don't know 
what it means?" For all 20 items, each of the three choices are 
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assigned scores of 0 for an inappropriate answer, 1 for a partially 
appropriate answer, and 2 for the best or most strategic answer 
(Jacobs & Paris, 1987). For the question above, the responses were 
categorized as: Best response (2 points)-Use the words around it to 
figure it out; Partial credit (1 point)-Ask someone else., and No credit 
(0 points)-Go on to the next word. Scores for each of the 20 items are 
then summed and higher scores are interpreted as reflective of more 
metacognitive knowledge. 
The Metacognitive Assessment Inventory (MAl), developed by 
Schraw and Dennison (1994), attempts to tap into metacognitive 
knowledge in a somewhat different manner than the IRA. The MAl 
presents college students with 52 different items grouped into two 
scales termed general metacognitive knowledge and regulation of 
cognition. As an example, one knowledge item on the MAl states, "I 
have a specific purpose for each strategy that I use." Students are 
asked to indicate how true or false each statement is for them on a 100 
mm line where 0 indicates not true at all and 100 mm indicates very true 
for me. Scores are computed by averaging the lengths of the line for 
items corresponding to each scale. 
The IRA is similar to a multiple-choice test, whereas the MAl is 
similar to a traditional self-report instrument. Taken together, empiri-
cal studies of these two instruments help to illustrate some of the 
issues that must be addressed when considering the construct validity 
of measures for assessing metacognitive knowledge. In what follows, 
we review research studies for each of these instruments using 
Messick's framework described in the previous section as an organi-
zational guide. 
Content Component. The IRA and the MAl provide a good contrast 
between a domain-specific and a more general measure of 
metacognition. Establishing evidence for the content validity of these 
instruments involves determining how well each covers the intended 
domain. The IRA is designed to assess metacognitive knowledge in 
the area of reading comprehension. Pressley and Afflerbach (1995) 
list over 150 different activities that skilled readers engage in as they 
read. In assessing metacognition U1 this context, how large a sample 
of items is needed to tap adequately the important components of 
these 150 activities? Are 20 items sufficient? Generalizability studies 
would provide important ffiformation on the extent to which the 
items on the test generalize to the larger domain of metacognitive 
knowledge (d. Shavelson, Gao, & Baxter, 1995). 
In contrast to the IRA, items on the MAl are not tied to any 
specific domau1 such as reading, but instead focus on more general 
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learning situations and hence more general metacognitive knowl-
edge. The content validity of this instrument depends on how well 
general metacognitive knowledge is sampled. The MAl includes 17 
items aimed at assessing students' declarative, procedural, and condi-
tional knowledge in addition to other items that measure aspects of 
metacognitive monitoring and control. Again, as for the IRA, ques-
tions as to the adequacy with which the 17 knowledge items ad-
equately sample the domain of general metacognitive knowledge 
have not been answered empirically. 
Substantial Component. Substantial validity concerns the match 
between the data generated by the items on the test and the construct 
theory. In terms of the IRA, the conceptual model predicts four 
subcomponents of metacognitive knowledge in reading: evaluation, 
planning, regulation, and conditional knowledge. Although Jacobs 
and Paris (1987) did not report factor analysis results or alphas for the 
four subscales of the IRA, a study by McLain, Gridley, and McIntosh 
(1991) of third, fourth, and fifth graders reported extremely low 
alphas (between .15 and .32) for the four subscales of the IRA. These 
results suggest that the four subscales of the IRA, although theoreti-
cally important, lack empirical support as four independent subcom-
ponents. 
Schraw and Dennison (1994) found a similar pattern of results 
with the MAL Although their conceptual model predicted eight 
subcomponents including three subscales for knowledge (declarative, 
procedural, and conditional), results of factor analyses in two differ-
ent studies of college students supported the use of only one knowl-
edge scale and one regulation scale. These two scales had high 
internal consistency producing alphas of .88 and .91, for knowledge 
and regulation, respectively. This theory-data mismatch is a continu-
ing problem in the field. There seem to be more factors or compo-
nents predicted by theory than supported by the data generated from 
the empirical studies of the insh"uments. 
This mismatch between theory and empirical data can be con-
ceived as a problem in "grain size" or resolution power as suggested 
by Howard-Rose and Winne (1993). That is, our theoretical models 
have proposed relatively fine distinctions, or small grain-size compo-
nents of metacognition. However, our instruments may not be 
powerful or precise enough to bring these smaller grain-size compo-
nents into resolution. It remains an issue for future research and 
development to determine if we need to develop more powerful 
"microscopes" to observe these smaller grain-sized units or whether 
we need to modify our theoretical models to reflect the functional 
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nature of the fairly molar components of metacognition and self-
regulated learning that seem to emerge from our data. 
Structural Component. An important aspect of structural validity 
is the way in which an instrument is scored, and in turn how scores 
are combined. For the IRA, students are given 0,1, or 2 points for each 
item based on the appropriateness of the response they select from 
three possible options. Points are swnmed to create a subscale score 
for each of the evaluation, planning, regulation, and conditional 
knowledge scales. The combination of these four scales results in a 
total score for the entire instrument. At the question level the scoring 
system is basically ordinal, the 2-point response is judged to be 
superior to the I-point response, which is considered superior to the 
a-point response. Nevertheless, the types of analyses carried out 
assume an interval scale. In the absence of a good theoretical model 
for differentiating the quality and quantity of metacognitive knowl-
edge, it is difficult to defend using interval or ordinal scaling metrics. 
Most of our theoretical models simply assume that more metacognitive 
knowledge is better, hence, the summative scoring on both the MAl 
and IRA. However, it may be more adaptive to have metacognitive 
knowledge that is situation- or task-specific, but we have not devel-
oped tasks and scoring rubics or metrics that can capture these types 
of conditional relations between metacognitive knowledge and differ-
ent tasks. Needless to say, this is an area that is ripe for further 
research and development activity. 
External Component. External validity is a reflection of how well 
performance on one measure is related to other measures of the same 
or different constructs. Paris and Jacobs (1984) and Schraw and 
Dennison (1994) attempted to provide some evidence that speaks to 
the external validity of their respective instruments by examining the 
relation between students' metacognitive knowledge and their stan-
dardized achievement test scores. Schraw and Dennison (1994) used 
portions of the Nelson-Denny vocabulary and reading comprehen-
sion tests with the MAl, whereas Paris and Jacobs (1984) used the Gates-
McGinitie test of reading achievement and McLain et al. (1991) used the 
Woodcock test of reacting in their stuclies of the IRA. In all cases, the 
authors found a positive, but modest relation between theiJ: respective 
measure of metacognitive knowledge and students' standardized achieve-
ment scores, with correlations ranging from .20 to .35. 
Correlations with standardized achievement tests provide some 
evidence to support the external validity of these instruments, but 
they should not be the sole criterion used in this regard because these 
rather global and stable measures may not be sensitive to variations 
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in metacognitive knowledge (Jacobs & Paris, 1987). There are other 
measures of performance and metacognition that might be expected 
to show positive relations. For example, Paris and Jacobs (1984) 
examined how students' scores on the IRA were related to their 
performance on both cloze and error-detection tasks, tasks that re-
quire more explicit metacognitive skills. These analyses showed that 
scores on the IRA were positively related to these measures of reading 
. comprehension and were of the same magnitude as correlations with 
standardized achievement tests. 
Another type of evidence that bears on this issue of external 
validity is the comparison of pre-existing groups or groups that are 
assigned to treatments that are thought to vary on the construct. For 
example, Paris and his colleagues fOlmd that the IRA distinguished 
between students who were classified as good and poor readers a 
priori (e.g., Cross & Paris, 1988; Paris & Jacobs, 1984; Paris & Oka, 
1986). Good readers were much more likely to have higher IRA 
scores. The IRA also distinguished between those students who 
received a specific curriculum designed to increase metacognitive 
knowledge and use of cognitive strategies and students who did not 
receive this program, with as expected, those in the metacognitive 
curriculum having higher IRA scores. As Messick (1989) notes, 
experimental studies of different types of students or students in 
different educational programs can add greatly to the evidence for the 
construct validity of the measure. Experimental studies are not used 
as frequently as correlational studies, but given the relative yield, 
experimental studies should be used more often in construct validity 
research on metacognition and self-regulated learning. 
Generality of Construct Meaning. Assessments of metacognitive 
knowledge have, for the most part, been designed for use with a 
particular age group within a particular domain. The IRA, for 
example, was designed for use with elementary school children who 
are beginning to read. Although studies conducted with the IRA have 
included large numbers of subjects, the studies have not included 
children from different racial! ethnic or ability backgrounds. Exam-
ining a more diverse subject population would provide insight into 
the generalizability of the construct across different populations of 
students. For example, Swanson (1993) examined the metacognitive 
knowledge of students classified as learning disabled, normative, or 
gifted. Differences in the degree to which metacognitive knowledge 
and problem-solving abilities were intercorrelated within these groups 
suggest tha t the meaning of the construct, in terms of its relation to 
other constructs, varies in different populations of students. 
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The MAl also has seen limited use in nontraditional populations, 
in part perhaps because the instrument is new. Nevertheless, similar 
points about generality of construct meaning can be made. Recall that 
the IRA was restricted to early elementary school students. The MAl 
has been used primarily at the other end of the educational spech'um, 
college students. College students are a select group of late adoles-
cents and generalizations to this age group in the general population 
are questionable. The use of undergraduate college students at a 
single university demonstrates a recurring generalizability issue in 
much psychological research. Examinlll.g metacognitive knowledge 
in groups or ages that extend the usual boundaries of samples of 
white, middle class students (d. Graham, 1992) will provide evidence 
to support the construct generality of the various instruments. 
Relevance and Utility Concerns for Test Use. The IRA and the MAl 
can be readily used in a classroom or group setting because they are 
easy to administer and most students are quite familiar with the 
response formats on each of these measures. Relative to other formats 
for aSSeSSlll.g meta cognition or self-regulation such as thiJ.l.k-alouds or 
interviews (to be discussed below), self-report questionnaires are easy 
for teachers and students to use and can provide information about a 
large number of students in a practical and efficient manner. 
Summary. According to a number of researchers, metacognitive 
knowledge is similar to other knowledge in long-term memory and 
can be accessed by the individual when properly cued (Alexander et 
al., 1991; Flavell, 1979). Thus, self-report instruments such as the IRA 
and the MAl seem appropriate for obtainillg this information. The 
ease and efficiency with which these measures can be admillistered 
and scored facilitate their use lll. educational and research settings. At 
the same time, there remain significant questions and concerns about 
the construct validity of these measures. First, the content represen-
tation of the items on these two instruments may not be adequate 
given the rather large domain of metacognitive knowledge they 
purport to measure. Second, there is a continuing mismatch between 
the theoretical models of metacognitive knowledge that propose 
multiple dimensions or subcomponents and the empirical data that 
often yields one general factor or scale of metacognitive knowledge. 
Third, there is a need for theore tical work on how best to conceptu-
alize a metric for quantifying metacognitive knowledge, followed by 
the concomitant psychometric research to validate new scaling proce-
dures. Fourth, although there is more research on the relations with 
standardized achievement tests and comparisons of different groups 
of students for measures of metacognitive knowledge than other 
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components, studies that include other constructs as external criteria 
(e.g., intelligence) would be useful. Finally, there is a great need for 
studies that examine the generalizability of these measures for groups 
of students that differ on age or ethnicity or educational category such 
as "at-risk" students. 
Measures of Metacognitive Judgments and Monitoring 
The awareness or monitoring aspect of metacognition reflects an 
"on-line" process that includes students' current thinking, awareness, 
consciousness, or monitoring of their cognitive operations just before, 
during, or just after completion of a task. There have been a number 
of different methods used to assess this aspect of meta cognition 
including self-report of monitoring-based judgments (see Baker, 1989b; 
Nelson & Narens, 1990; Tobias, this volume; Tobias & Everson, 1995), 
error-detection studies, interviews, and think-aloud protocols (Pressley 
& Afflerbach, 1995). We first provide general descriptions of these 
different measures and then an analysis of the empirical evidence for 
construct validity. 
Self-report. Nelson, Narens, and their colleagues carried out a 
series of studies using self-report judgments to measure student 
monitoring (Leonesio & Nelson, 1990; Nelson, 1996; Nelson, Gerler, & 
Narens, 1984; Nelson & Narens, 1990). Generally, students are pre-
sented with some information to be retrieved later (e.g., a list of 
words, a paired associates recall task). Before they actually perform 
the memory task they are asked to rank or rate how easy the informa-
tion will be to learn (an ease-of-Iearning judgment or EOL). Then, 
these subjects are given a number of learning/study trials where they 
learn the list to criterion. After the learning trials, students are asked 
to rank or rate their level of learning, or to make a judgment of their 
level of learning (a judgment-of-Iearning or JOL). Students are then 
given a retention test and are told which items they did not recall. 
After receiving this feedback on their performance, students are asked 
to rank or rate which of those unrecalled items they think they may 
know. These judgments are called feeling of knowing (FOK) judg-
ments (Leonesio & Nelson, 1990; Nelson et al., 1984; Nelson & Narens, 
1990). Students' confidence in their performance is usually assessed 
after a performance; students are asked to make some rating or 
assessment of how well they did on the task. Taking actual perfor-
mance as the standard, the accuracy of these judgments is considered 
an indicator of students' monitoring ability. Thus, students who felt 
they knew something and did, as well as students who felt they did 
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not know something and did not, are both considered good monitors 
of their performance. The assumption is that the ability to make 
accurate judgments of what one knows and what one does not know 
is an important aspect of metacognitive monitoring. 
Using a similar judgment method with a different set of tasks, 
Pressley and his associates asked students how well they performed 
just before, during, or just after completing memory or reading tasks 
(Hunter-Blanks, et al., 1988; Pressley et al., 1990; Pressley, Levin, 
Ghatala, & Ahmad, 1987a; Pressley et al., 1987b). For example, 
Pressley et al. (1987b) reported three experiments in which under-
graduate students read short passages from an introductory psychol-
ogy textbook and predicted their level of performance on either 
multiple-choice or fill-in-the-blank questions. In line with the con-
structs from the Nelson and Narens (1990) framework, these types of 
studies assess students' judgments of learning (JOL) because they ask 
for an assessment of current learning. 
In contrast to the JOL measures of current learning, Tobias and his 
colleagues asked students to make judgments of prior learning-what 
they already know-about word knowledge or mathematics problem 
solving (see Tobias, this volume; Tobias & Everson, 1995; Tobias, 
Hartman, Everson, & Gourey, 1991). In their studies of word knowl-
edge, students are shown a list of words and then asked to check one 
of two boxes indicating whether they know the definition of the 
word or they do not know the definition. Similarly for the math-
ematics problem-solving task, students are shown a set of mathemat-
ics problems and asked to check one of two boxes indicating whether 
they can solve the problem or they cannot solve the problem. Stu-
dents are asked to go through these estimates quickly; judging 30 
mathematics problems in 6 minutes or about 12 seconds per problem. 
Error detection. In work directed by Baker, an error detection 
methodology was used to assess metacognitive monitoring (Baker 
1979, 1984, 1985, 1989a, 1989b). Typically, in these studies, students 
are presented with passages or sentences containing errors, omis-
sions, or inconsistencies within the text, and are asked to identify 
aspects of the text that make it difficult to understand. Students who 
detected more problems were considered better comprehension moni-
tors than students who detected fewer problems. This method, 
although not typical of the kind of texts or reading situations stu-
dents usually encounter, allows the researcher more direct behav-
ioral evidence of students' monitoring than is provided by self-report 
measures. 
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Think-Aloud. Researchers have also examined monitoring with 
think-aloud or interview methodologies. For example, Pressley and 
Afflerbach (1995) summarize the results of a number of studies that 
have used think-aloud protocols to examine what students do as they 
read various types of texts. Consistently, these studies indicated the 
overall importance of monitoring in reading behavior; students who 
are better monitors of their reading show higher levels of reading 
comprehension and more learning. Further, these studies have iden-
tified a number of different aspects of monitoring including monitor-
ing of the text characteristics, monitoring of self-understanding and 
problems in comprehension, and monitoring of cognitive processes 
used to read and understand text (Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995). 
Given these different methods for measuring metacognitive judg-
ments and monitoring, there are a number of issues to consider in 
terms of construct validity. We now turn to an analysis of the 
construct validity of these different measures of metacognitive judg-
ment and monitoring. 
Content Component. In the self-judgment methods of Nelson, 
Narens, Tobias, and others, individuals are asked to rate a set of items 
and then these same items are used in the performance or criterion 
task. In this sense, the internal logic for the study insures a perfect 
match, or overlap in terms of content representation, between the 
judgment task and the criterion task. On the other hand, the items 
used in these judgment tasks sample only a small range of possible 
content areas such as word definitions or arithmetic problems, leav-
ing many other content areas not represented. Accordingly, if the 
judgment task samples the student's awareness of vocabulary word 
definitions (see Tobias, this volume), this measure of monitoring does 
not necessarily represent the student's monitoring of their mathemat-
ics knowledge. 
In terms of meaningfulness, the reading and mathematics tasks 
used by researchers like Tobias, Baker, and Pressley are seemingly 
more relevant for academic learnmg than the paired-associate memory 
tasks used in the work by Nelson and Narens and their colleagues 
because of their similarity to classroom tasks. Nevertheless, some of 
the tasks used in the studies of reading have used texts with pur-
posely misspelled words, nonsensical sentences, or other types of 
errors embedded in the text. Although these kind of tasks may be 
motivating and interesting for some students, like doing a puzzle or 
game, they are not representative of the usual texts students encoun-
ter in the classroom (e.g., textbooks) or outside the classroom (e.g., 
newspapers, magazines) that are designed to be error-free. It remains 
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an empirical question whether this difference in meaningfulness 
between authentic texts and "error-filled" texts influence students' 
monitoring processes. 
The research on metacognitive monitoring also illustrates how an 
assessment technique might adequately cover a broad spectrum of 
content within a particular domain but not across domains. Pressley 
and his colleagues, for instance, have examined monitoring while 
students read individual words and sentences, extended passages on 
the PSAT and SAT, or introductory psychology textbooks (Hunter-
Blanks et al., 1988; Pressley et al., 1987a; Pressley et al., 1987b; Pressley 
et al., 1990). In a similar manner, Baker (1979, 1984, 1985, 1989a, 
1989b) has examined students' ability to monitor the presence of 
many different types of errors within different text formats. Hence, 
within a specific domain, such as reading comprehension, these 
researchers have used an array of content in their measures of moru-
toring. Similar results of students' monitoring in other domains (e.g., 
science, social studies, reasoning, problem solving) would add to the 
evidence supporting inferences about the construct validity of our 
instruments. In addition, students' prediction accuracy or error 
detection while completing a science experiment or while listening to 
a discussion in social studies would provide further insights into 
students' overall monitoring behavior. 
Substantive Component. Unlike the measures of meta cognitive 
knowledge presented earlier, many of the measures of monitoring 
we have discussed in this section have not used items that could be 
readily subjected to factor analytic studies as a means of examining 
the internal relations among the item responses. However, in the 
comprehension monitoring research by Baker and Pressley, there is 
some evidence to suggest individual differences in detection of errors/ 
text problems and monitoring of comprehension. Baker (1985,1989b) 
notes that there seem to be at least seven different types of standards that 
individuals can use to evaluate text, ranging from a lexical standard 
focused on individual word comprehension to more molar standards 
involving internal consistency and structural cohesiveness within the 
text. Individuals who use different standards will detect different errors 
or problems in the text. If the experimenter counts only detection of 
word errors, but a subject is using a more molar standard such as 
internal consistency or structural cohesiveness and does not detect the 
word errors, this subject may be considered a poor monitor, when in 
effect she is monitoring the text in a different manner. 
As noted above in the metacognitive knowledge section, the issue 
of grain size and theoretical divisions of metacognition versus the 
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empirical evidence or resolution power of our instruments to ad-
equately measure these divisions is important. On the one hand, 
much of the think-aloud literature reported by Pressley and Afflerbach 
(1995) suggests that monitoring and regulating processes often occur 
together and are difficult to separate empirically. On the other hand, 
there are good theoretical reasons for discussing monitoring and 
regulating as distinct processes (see Baker, 1989b; Zimmerman, 1989). 
This problem has implications for the development of self-report 
measures of monitoring. Developers of these types of measures may 
have to consciously choose whether to have measures that represent 
monitoring and regulation as relatively distinct aspects of 
metacognition and self-regulated learning thereby reflecting theory, 
or measures that blur the boundaries between these two components, 
reflecting much of the empirical evidence. 
Structural Component. The relation between test scores and the 
construct of interest is of particular concern when considering 
metacognitive judgments and monitoring. Measures of EOL, JOL, 
and FOK rely on an analysis of the consistency between the subjects' 
responses to the judgment task (their perc~ptions) and their actual 
performance on the task. In the typical case, the pattern of responses 
can be organized in a two-by-two matrix representing the crossing of 
the judgments (yes/no about whether subjects know an item or not) 
with actual performance (yes/no regarding their recall or correctness 
of response). In this simple matrix, scores that are in the two cells of 
yes-yes and no-no are often called "hits" and reflect accuracy or 
calibration because of the match between judgment and performance. 
That is, the subjects judge they know it and they do (the yes-yes cell) 
or they judge they do not know it and they do not (the no-no cell). 
Subjects who have more scores in these two cells than the two off-
diagonal cells (often called "misses" in judgment) are deemed to be 
better at monitoring or better calibrated given that there is substantial 
agreement between their judgments and actual performance. Sub-
jects whose scores fall primarily in the yes-no cell (say they know it, 
but do not know it, an overestimation) or in the no-yes cell (say they 
do not know it, but then do recall it or know it, an underestimation) 
are assumed to be less effective at monitoring or less calibrated given 
the minimal agreement between their judgments and actual perfor-
mance (d. Tobias, this volume). 
Although the methodological issues with this type of scoring 
system are complex and beyond the scope of this paper, we briefly 
mention one important consideration. Schraw (1995) calls attention to 
the distinction between measures of association and measures of 
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accuracy in developing scoring systems for analyzing the pattern of 
scores in the matrix of hits and misses. In his discussion, he points out 
that many studies have used gamma as a measure of association 
between judgments and performance scores. However, gamma re-
flects degree of association and not level of agreement. Using both 
mathematical and theoretical arguments, Schraw (1995) also shows 
that a simple matching coefficient does not capture all the information 
about accuracy either because it does not take into consideration 
miscalculations or mismatches (see Tobias, this volume; Tobias & 
Everson, 1995). For a measure of accuracy, he suggests the use of the 
Hamann coefficient, which includes information from both matches 
and mismatches by the student, thereby expanding the range of 
information that is used. He concludes that judgment studies should 
include measures of association like gamma as well as measures of 
accuracy such as the Hamann coefficient. Using an array of these 
types of measures of both association and accuracy will provide 
interval scales for data analysis and also will avoid the problem of 
using two simple measures of hits (or matches) and misses (or 
nonmatches) that are not independent from one another (i.e., if one 
has a high "hit" rate, then one's "miss" rate will be lower). 
Another issue regarding the scoring of data from the matrix of 
hits and misses concerns the categorization of individuals into differ-
ent groups, reflecting a more idiographic analysis. For example, 
scores from the judgment-performance relational data can be used to 
classify subjects into those who are calibrated (high agreement be-
tween judgments and performance), those who are overestimators 
(relatively high level of confidence in judgments and low level of 
performance), or those who are underestimators (low level of confi-
dence in judgments and high level of performance). This type of 
scoring classifies individuals into three general groups in terms of 
their overall level of calibration. In the same way, Baker (1989b) 
suggests that there may be stable individual differences in reading 
comprehension monitoring resulting in two basic groups of skilled 
and unskilled readers. Again, this would reflect a more person-
centered analysis focused on classifying students into two general 
groups of skilled and unskilled readers, or at least skilled and un-
skilled monitors of reading. Pressley and Afflerbach (1995) also 
suggest that some type of categorical system that distinguishes be-
tween good and poor readers may capture much of the important 
variance. This type of categorical analysis conceptualizes metacognitive 
monitoring in terms of different "types" of people who are either 
good or poor monitors, rather than the idea that individuals can and 
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do vary along a continuum in terms of their monitoring ability. 
Accordingly, a model that proposes that the construct of monitoring 
should be represented along a continuum should generate and use 
the various continuous measures of monitoring discussed above. In 
contrast, a more person-centered model of monitoring that stresses a 
disjunction between good and poor monitors should generate and 
utilize dichotomous scoring methods. 
External Component. Questions of how the various measures of 
metacognitive judgment and monitoring are related to: (a) each other, 
(b) measures of metacognitive knowledge and regulation, and (c) 
other constructs such as prior knowledge and general intelligence are 
addressed under the external component of construct validity. In the 
metamemory research on EOL, JOL, and FOK measures, Leonesio 
and Nelson (1990) have shown that these three types of judgment 
measures are only weakly related to one another. Correlations 
ranging from .12 to .17 among the three measures suggests that EOL, 
JOL, and FOK judgments are tapping different aspects of monitoring. 
Pressley and his colleagues (e.g., Hunter-Blanks, Ghatala, Pressley, & 
Levin, 1988; Pressley, Snyder, Levin, Murray, & Ghatala, 1987b) 
examined the relations among various measures of monitoring by 
using judgments of learning at different times during the reading-
testing process, reflecting EOL, JOL, FOK, and confidence measures 
of monitoring. Results indicated that JOLs and confidence ratings 
were more closely tied to performance in comparisons to EOLs or 
FOKs. In most of the studies by Pressley and his colleagues, students 
were assigned to one of three conditions defined by when they were 
asked to make their judgments (before reading, after reading, or after 
testing). This type of between-subject design does not allow for 
comparisons within individuals across measures as in the Leonesio 
and Nelson (1990) study. Accordingly, although there is experimen-
tal evidence that different types of judgments (i.e., EOLs, JOLs, and 
FOKs) can have different relations to performance, thereby suggest-
ing different functions for these components (Nelson, 1996), there is 
still a need for within-subject designs that allow for intra individual 
comparisons of the relations among EOLs, JOLs, and FOKs. 
In terms of how monitoring is related to metacognitive knowl-
edge and control or regulation, the findings are mixed. Pressley and 
Afflerbach (1995) have shown that monitoring and regulating are 
often reported together in think-aloud protocols. Paris and Oka 
(1986) have shown that metacognitive knowledge is weakly related to 
performance on error detection tasks with correlations ranging from 
.15 to .30. Baker (1989b) notes that predictions of learning (EOLs), 
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judgments of comprehension or learning (JOLs), and confidence in 
learning (postdictions of learning) are often not clearly related to 
performance. This type of mixed evidence signals the need for 
research to clarify the conceptual relations among the three general 
components of meta cognitive knowledge, monitoring, and control 
and regulation as well as their relations with actual performance. 
Finally, measures of monitoring should assess monitoring and 
not other constructs such as verbal ability, prior knowledge, or 
general intelligence (Pressley & Ghatala, 1990). In the error-detection 
method described above, students are told to look for errors. This 
may invoke a level of monitoring in which the students do not 
typically engage when reading. Accordingly, performance on the 
error detection task may not represent spontaneous monitoring, the 
actual construct of interest. Moreover, students' monitoring per se is 
not measured, rather monitoring is operationalized as the reporting of 
problems in the text. In addition, students may notice but hesitate to 
report problems with the text because they fear being wrong or 
because of epistemic beliefs about text that constrain their reporting of 
errors. For example, as Baker (1989b) has pointed out, if students 
endorse the cooperative text principle of Grice, they generally believe 
that texts are correct and should be error-free. When operating with 
this belief, students will be unlikely to report all errors in the text. To 
the extent that factors other than metacognitive monitoring influence 
students' reporting of problems in the text, results of error-detection 
studies may be challenged in terms of the evidence they provide of 
construct validity. 
In the think-aloud studies, spontaneous monitoring is evoked and 
can be assessed quantitatively and qualitatively (Pressley & Afflerbach, 
1995). However, think-aloud protocols require students to perform 
the actual task and simultaneously verbalize their thoughts. The 
cognitive demands of this dual task may vary with the expertise or 
knowledge of the student, the extent to which students have automa-
tized some of the cognitive activities, the age of the student, and/ or 
their verbal ability. Consequently, verbal reports of monitoring may 
be confounded with these other constructs and may not provide the 
best evidence for construct validity. 
Unlike the work on metacognitive knowledge, there is not as 
much validity research on how students' monitoring is related to 
performance on standardized achievement tests . Given that monitor-
ing is an ongoing process for a specific text or task, the relation to 
standardized general achievement tests may be variable. For ex-
ample, Pressley et al. (1990) found that actual comprehension perfor-
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mance was moderately correlated with scores on a subset of SAT 
verbal items (rs ranged from .42 to .59), but that these same scores 
were not significantly related to monitoring of comprehension as 
measmed by prediction scores (rs ranged from -.24 to .39, but were 
not significant due to power of test, small sample sizes). Pressleyet 
a1. (1987b) also reported no significant relation between students' 
general abilities (as measured with SAT and GRE items) and their 
monitoring as measured by estimates of test readiness (a JOL judg-
ment). Paris and Oka (1986), however, did report that measures of 
error detection were positively related to performance on a standard-
ized reading test, even after general intelligence was partialled out, 
although the magnitude of the relation was small (rs ranged from .09 
to .23). Tobias and Everson (1995) reported that their measures of 
metacognitive judgments of mathematics knowledge were highly 
correlated with scores on the mathematics section of the Metropolitan 
Achievement Test (r = .76 for correct estimate scores, and r = -.72 for 
incorrect estimates scores). Despite these encomaging results, more 
research on how various measmes of monitoring are related to stan-
dardized measmes of achievement and ability will improve our under-
standing of the relations among the different aspects of monitoring and 
other constructs such as general ability, achievement, and leaTning. 
Generality of Construct Meaning. Research on measures of moni-
toring have been carried out with groups of students varying in age 
and gender but not varying in ethnic/racial/cultural background. 
For example, Pressley et a1. (1987a) included students from the first 
and fifth grade, Pressley and Ghatala (1989) included first, second, 
fomth, fifth, seventh and eighth graders, whereas Pressley et a1. (1987b) 
and Hunter-Blanks et a1. (1988) used lmdergraduate students. Baker has 
focused on adults and much of the metamemory research of Nelson and 
Narens and their colleagues has been carried out with college students. 
Although studies by Baker (see summary in Baker, 1989b) have 
tended to rely on the adult reader, students of different developmen-
tal levels have also been included. In addition, Baker has examined 
how error detection might differ among good and poor readers. In 
some of these studies gender differences were explored and found 
(e.g., Pressley et a1., 1987a; Pressley & Ghatala, 1989). Hence, results 
from this work extend over a broad age range and across gender, 
suggesting the generalizability of the measures across diverse popu-
lations. Nevertheless, like much of the research in psychology and 
education (see Betancourt & Lopez, 1993; Graham, 1992), there is a 
large void in terms of our understanding of these constructs and 
measures in diverse cultural, racial, and ethnic populations. 
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Besides this issue of sample generality, there remains the per-
petual and crucial issue of domain generality. Does a general moni-
toring skill exist or is monitoring dependent on domain expertise or 
other personal and contextual factors (Schraw, Dunkle, Bendixen, & 
Roedel,1995)7 Schraw et al. (1995) have shown that there are domain-
general and domain-specific aspects of metacognitive monitoring. 
They found that confidence judgments were correlated across differ-
ent domains of knowledge and a factor analysis of several different 
measures of monitoring (confidence, discrimination, bias) did gener-
ate one general monitoring factor. However, they also found that a 
measure of monitoring accuracy (the discrimination score, which 
takes into account correct and incorrect predictions) showed a do-
main-specific pattern of results . They suggest that there may be a 
developmental progression from a domain-specific expertise to a 
general monitoring skill. Accordingly, measures of monitoring have 
to be sensitive to developmental and domain-specific factors that 
might bear on the construct validity of domain-general measures of 
monitoring. 
Relevance and Utility Concerns for Test Use. As noted above in the 
metacognitive knowledge section, measures vary in their relevance 
and utility for researchers versus practitioners. Think-aloud proto-
cols offer a window into the kinds of monitoring processes that 
individuals use as they perform cognitive tasks and are therefore 
probably best suited for researchers who are attempting to provide a 
detailed description of the various monitoring processes (Pressley & 
Afflerbach, 1995). However, protocol analysis is time and labor-
intensive, requires specific training, and cannot be used easily or 
efficiently with large groups of students thereby limiting its use in 
classroom settings. In contrast, methods like the error-detection tasks 
can be used by both researchers and teachers. These tasks do not rely 
on verbal reports and can be tied closely to the types of classroom 
tasks in which many students engage on a regular basis such as 
reading different texts. As such, they provide opportunities for 
teachers to examine monitoring in their students quickly and to guide 
lessons on reading comprehension skills. 
Formal measures of EOL, JOL, FOK, and confidence are probably 
best suited for use by researchers. It seems unlikely that teachers 
would have students go through and rate all the items on a test or 
questions on a worksheet in terms of their difficulty before, during, 
and/ or after performing the task. However, teachers can use infor-
mal methods of assessment by asking students to think about their 
prior knowledge before reading a text, or self-question themselves 
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about their understanding (a good strategy for monitoring) during 
reading, or self-test themselves after reading a text. These informal 
assessment procedures may be useful to teachers, at a very global 
level, to determine students' ability to monitor their comprehension. 
Summary. There are a number of instruments that can be used to 
assess metacognitive judgment and monitoring skills. Although each 
of the measures discussed in this section is backed by considerable 
empirical data, there remain a number of unresolved issues. First, at 
a conceptual level, researchers need to be careful in terms of their 
labels for different aspects of metacognitive judgments in terms of 
EOLs, JOLs, FOKs, and confidence ratings. The proliferation of 
different labels for the same basic constructs makes it difficult to 
summarize and compare results from different studies. If any science 
is to make significant advances, there is a need for clearly defined and 
agreed-upon labels for the constructs under study. The area of 
metacognitive monitoring has generated a large number of different 
terms that do not help facilitate communication. We propose that the 
framework of EOLs, JOLs, FOKs, and confidence judgments is a 
reasonable start in the direction of fostering clarity and consensus. 
Second, because current measures are primarily restricted to reading 
and mathematics, questions regarding the operation of monitoring in 
other domains remain unanswered. Third, there remains an issue 
about the conceptual and empirical separation of monitoring from 
regulating. As we saw in the previous section on metacognitive 
knowledge, our theoretical models of metacognitive monitoring pro-
pose more distinctions and subcomponents than what is often found 
in our empirical data. In particular, most models propose a separa-
tion of monitoring and regulation, but these two components are 
often fused in learning. It may be difficult to develop assessment 
instruments that can reliably and validly tease these subcomponents 
apart, so our conceptual models may have to be adjusted unless we 
can develop instruments with higher resolution power. Fourth, in 
terms of scoring measures of metacognitive judgments (structural 
component), more careful measures of both association and accuracy 
need to be used as Schraw (1995) has proposed. Fifth, although the 
evidence for the external component of construct validity is fairly 
good, there is still a need for more research with diverse samples to 
improve the generality of construct meaning. Finally, efforts are 
needed to bridge the gap between experimental methods of assessing 
meta cognitive monitoring (e.g., EOLs, JOLs, etc. from metamemory 
paradigm; Nelson & Narens, 1990) as well as the error detection tasks 
and think-aloud protocols and those (e.g., ratings of knowledge; see 
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Tobias, this volume) that can be more easily used in classrooms by 
researchers and teachers. 
Measures of Self-Regulation and Control of Cognition 
Although there are data suggesting that monitoring and regula-
tion are often fused in actual performance (Pressley & Afflerbach, 
1995), measures have been developed that focus more on regulation 
and control of cognition than on monitoring. Three general methods 
have been used to assess regulation: think-aloud protocols, self-report 
questionnaires, and interviews. We have already described think-
aloud protocols in the previous section. Here we concentrate on self-
report questionnaires and interviews. A number of different 
questionnaires have been used to assess various aspects of regulation 
including the Learning and Study Strategies Inventory or LASSI 
(Weinstein et al., 1987; Weinstein et al., 1988), the Motivated Strategies 
for Learning Questionnaire or MSLQ (Pintrich & De Groot, 1990; Pintrich, 
Smith et al., 1993) and other more focused instruments such as Kuhl's 
action-control scale (Kuhl, 1985) and other study skills instruments such 
as Brown and Holtzman's (1967) Survey of Study Habits and Attitudes. 
Given our research with the MSLQ, we concentrate on that instrument 
as representative of a questionnaire to measure self-regulated learning. 
For comparative purposes, we consider some aspects of the LASS!. 
Self-regulated learning has also been measured in various inter-
view studies, but the Self-Regulated Learning Interview Schedule 
(SRLIS) developed by Zimmerman and Martinez-Pons (1986, 1988) is 
the most formalized interview measure available, so we concentrate 
on this exemplar in this section. Together, these three instruments-
the MSLQ, the LASSI, and the SRLIS-can be used to illustrate some 
of the important construct validity issues concerning assessments of 
students' regulation of their cognition. 
The MSLQ and LASSI are self-report instruments that ask stu-
dents to respond to Likert-type items concerning their level of cogni-
tive strategy use and their regulation of cognition. The key difference 
between the two instruments is the theoretical assumption about the 
nature of self-regulation underlying their development. The LASSI 
was developed from a domain-general perspective. Students are 
asked about what they do in general in terms of their learning. The 
MSLQ reflects a more domain-specific view, at least in terms of 
domain specificity being operationalized at the course level. Students 
are asked to respond to the items in terms of what they do in a specific 
course or class. The MSLQ is not task specific (e.g., exam, reading 
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textbook, writing a paper) or knowledge-base specific (biology, math-
ematics, history, etc.), which might be important from some perspec-
tives (see Schraw et al., 1995). 
In terms of cognitive strategy use, individual scales on the MSLQ 
are designed to assess rehearsal, elaboration, organization, and criti-
cal thinking, whereas metacognitive monitoring and self-regulation 
are assessed using one 12-item scale (Pintrich, Smith et al., 1993). In 
addition, resource management strategies are assessed in four differ-
ent scales, including time and study management, effort regulation, 
peer learning, and help seeking (Pintrich, Smith et al., 1993). A typical 
question from the regulation scale of the MSLQ states, "When I become 
confused about something I'm reading for this class, I go back and try 
to figure it out." 
The SRLIS, using an individual-interview format, asks respon-
dents about specific tasks with follow-up probes questioning how 
they would behave in six different academic contexts (Zimmerman & 
Martinez-Pons, 1986). These contexts are a classroom discussion, 
short writing assignment, mathematics assignment, end-of-term test, 
homework assignment, and studying at home. Students are pre-
sented with a one- or two-sentence description of the context and then 
asked about their methods for managing the situation (Zimmerman & 
Martinez-Pons, 1986). For example, for the test-taking context stu-
dents are told, "Most teachers give a test at the end of the marking 
period, and these tests greatly determine the final grade." Then, they 
are asked "Do you have a particular method for preparing for a test 
in classes like English or history?" Whereas ratings of the items on the 
MSLQ are averaged into scales, SRLIS responses are categorized into 
1 of 14 different categories representing knowledge (e.g., organizing), 
monitoring behavior (e.g., keeping records, self-evaluation), strategy 
use (e.g., rehearsing and memorizing), and regulation (e.g., goal 
setting and planning). 
Content Component. As reflected in the many scales of the MSLQ 
and the 14 different categories of strategies from the SRLIS, items on 
these measures attempt to cover important content in self-regulation 
and control of cognition. There is also evidence that these two 
measures strive to represent content from the diverse domain of 
regulation strategies by sampling strategies related to many different 
academic activities. The MSLQ queries students about one particular 
class and focuses on reading and study activities, although a few 
items refer to other academic situations (e.g., note taking, listening to 
lectures). In other research, however, items on the MSLQ have been 
modified to cover specifically a broader range of academic contexts 
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by preceding items with cues to different situations such as "When I 
study for a test ... ," "When I do homework .. . ," or "When the teacher 
is talking ... " (Pintrich & De Groot, 1990). More recently, items from 
this instrument have been used specifically to assess regulation within 
different subject areas in order to evaluate between-domain differ-
ences (Wolters & Pintrich, 1998). 
The SRLIS also asks students to report their strategy use across a 
variety of academic tasks (e.g., classroom discussion, test taking, and 
homework) and different academic subject areas (e.g., history, math-
ematics). Further, this open-ended interview allows students free-
dom to respond with the particular strategies they use in these 
different contexts. Overall, both of these measures provide a breadth 
of coverage in terms of strategies for different tasks and subject areas 
as well as the type of strategies assessed. This coverage seems to 
provide reasonable content representativeness of the many different 
control and regulation strategies available relative to other assess-
ments that focus on one type of task, one academic domain, or a small 
number of strategies. 
Substantive Component. The MSLQ provides a reasonable match 
between the theoretical model and the empirical results of confirma-
tory factor analyses with data from college students (see Pintrich, 
Smith et al., 1993). For example, in our structural equation models we 
have a chi square/ratio of 2.26 (values under 5.00 are considered 
optimal), a GFI of .78 (GFls of .90 or above are considered optimal), 
and a CN of 180 (CNs of 200 and above are considered optimal). 
Although some of the fit statistics for our structural equation models 
could be improved by having a less theoretically based factor struc-
ture, we have opted to maintain the theoretical structure as long as 
the data provide a reasonable fit to the model. Of course, this problem 
of lack of a stronger fit between the theoretical model and the actual 
empirical data parallels the problems mentioned previously in our 
discussion of both metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive moni-
toring. In general, the problem remains that our conceptual models 
propose more components and complexity than are supported by the 
empirical data. 
Using data from younger students, such as junior high school 
students, we have not been able to reproduce as detailed a factor 
structure as in the college data (Pintrich & De Groot, 1990). For 
example, rather than three scales that reflect different types of cogni-
tive strategy use, the junior high data only formed one scale reflecting 
students' combined use of rehearsal, elaboration, and organizational 
strategies. In the same fashion, the two scales of metacognitive and 
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effort management, distinct in the college student data, combined into 
one scale with the junior high students. These results could reflect the 
general developmental orthogenetic principle of Werner (1948), which 
suggests that, with development, systems change from being rela-
tively undifferentiated to having very differentiated components or-
ganized into a hierarchy. On the other hand, the results could just 
reflect a problem in generality of construct meaning with younger 
students or a problem with construct irrelevant variance arising from 
the use of self-reports with young students. 
In both the college and junior high data, there was no support for 
separate metacognitive scales of planning, monitoring, and regulat-
ing. Hence, although the lmderlying theory suggests that these 
aspects of metacognition and self-regulation should be distinguish-
able, the data do not support this assumption. Results such as these 
challenge the substantial component of construct validity and high-
light the grain size and instrument resolution problem mentioned 
previously. 
The SRLIS produces interview data coded according to 14 differ-
ent categories of strategies that are based upon a specific theory of 
self-regulation (see Zimmerman, 1989, 1994). On one hand, given that 
these categories determine the type of information extracted from 
students' interviews, this instrument may have a higher degree of 
substantive validity than interviews that code responses using post 
hoc categories. On the other hand, Zimmerman and Martinez-Pons 
(1988) have shown that a principal component analysis groups 12 out 
of 14 categories into one large factor that they call Student Self-
Regulated Learning. Again, paralleling the data from the IRA and 
MAlon metacognitive knowledge, the think-aloud protocol data 
from Pressley and Afflerbach (1995) on metacognitive monitoring, 
and the MSLQ data on regulation, these findings from the SRLIS 
suggest that students who engage in one component of self-regulated 
learning also engage in other components. Accordingly, efforts to 
separate the different components into theoretically smaller subcom-
ponents may not be justified by the empirical data. 
Taken together, the data from the MSLQ and SRLIS, as well as the 
monitoring data from the think-aloud protocols, suggest that al-
though we can distinguish monitoring and regulation theoretically, 
the empirical data are more ambiguous. It appears that some students 
tend to engage in a variety of these strategies and other students are 
less likely to report using them. There is clearly a need for more 
specification of the theoretical model or nomological network of 
constructs that involve both monitoring and regulation, followed by 
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careful research on how these improved models can help us develop 
substantively valid and high resolution measures. 
Structural Component. One difficulty with data from the SRLIS is 
that it is not easy to quantify the scores in a manner that will yield 
interval data. Zimmerman and Martinez-Pons (1986), for example, 
proposed and tested three different methods for scoring results from 
the SRLIS. Based on its ability to distinguish between students of 
different achievement groups (using the Metropolitan Achievement 
Tests), Zimmerman and Martinez-Pons (1986) chose a scoring method 
dependent on students' mention of a particular strategy and their 
report of how often they used that strategy. This overall measure 
seemed to provide a better index than did counts of strategy use or 
strategy frequency, although these other two measures also discrimi-
nated between the two achievement groups. 
The MSLQ is scored by taking the mean of the students' ratings 
for the items that comprise a scale. However, it should be noted that 
the MSLQ does not provide any normative data for comparison as 
does the LASS!. Users of the LASSI have available the norms for a 
large sample of students and comparisons can be made between an 
individual's score on a scale and the scale score based on the normative 
sample. In contrast, the MSLQ is based on the assumption that students' 
use of strategies and self-regulation may vary by type of course and 
specific classes and so norms are not provided. Although this may be 
more in line with current views of self-regulated learning, lack of 
normative data restricts some of the practical uses of the MSLQ. 
Given the differences in scoring and conceptual models, there 
may be some evidence to support the use of more idiographic or 
person-centered categorical systems of scoring that simply classify 
students into good or poor self-regulators or sh'ategy users (see 
Pressley, Harris, & Marks, 1992). The use of norms, as in the LASSI, 
suggests that students can be compared and then classified into 
different categories of more or less self-regulating learners. The 
interview data from the SRLIS could also be used in such a manner. 
As was discussed in the section on monitoring, this distinction be-
tween continuous versus categorical scoring systems is an important 
one for future research to address. 
External Component. One issue with the MSLQ and the SRLIS is 
that, like the assessments of monitoring, it is not clear if the measures 
primarily assess the construct of interest Both of these instruments 
ask students to report, retrospectively, how they behave in general 
types of situations. These measures do not question students about a 
previously completed specific task. Because of this format, students 
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are more apt to access long-term memory and make generalizations 
about what they believe they do in a particular situation. Conse-
quently, self-reports have been criticized for their potential to be 
biased or inaccurate (Ericsson & Simon, 1993; Garner, 1988; Pressley 
& Afflerbach, 1995). For instance, on the MSLQ students may endorse 
the statement "I try to change the way I study in order to fit the course 
requirements and instructor's teaching style," not because they really 
change their study behavior, but because they know that this would 
be a good strategy. In this case, student responses may tap into 
metacognitive knowledge as well as regulation of cognition. One way 
to remedy this problem is to adapt items so that students are referring 
to specific recent incidents or recently completed tasks when they 
respond. Nevertheless, these self-report measures are still subject to 
problems of students having conscious access to their strategy use, 
being able to verbalize their stra tegy use, as well as being unbiased 
and accurate in their reporting (i.e., reporting more strategy use than 
actually engaged in for social desirability reasons). 
Another way to address this problem would be to assess control 
and regulation using a more "on-line" methodology such as stimulated 
recall or think-aloud. Howard-Rose and Wume (1993), for example, 
devised a task in which students reported what they were thinking and 
doing while they were still in the process of reading a passage, perhaps 
giving a more direct measure of regulation and monitorulg. The 
considerable time and effort involved Ul instructiI1.g students in how to 
perform this task combined with the actual administration time, 
reduce the utility of this method. Furthermore, the ability to general-
ize this task to other tasks and other populations may be limited to older 
students who are able to manage the cognitive load produced by 
simultaneous task completion and the thulk-aloud task. 
Although these problems of consh·uct validity are always present 
with self-report instruments, there is evidence bearing on the external 
component of construct validity that supports the use of self-report 
instruments. Students' scores on the regulation portions of the MSLQ 
and the SRLIS have been linked in predictable ways to a nwnber of other 
indicators of learning, performance, and motivation. Strategy use and 
regulation, as measured by the MSLQ, were related to seventh-grade 
students' fu·st and second semester grades and theu· achievement on 
different types of classroom tasks where regulation may influence 
performance (Pultrich & Garcia, 1991; Pinh·ich & De Groot, 1990). For 
example, PUltricll and De Groot (1990) fOlmd that the MSLQ regulation 
scale was related to students' performance durUlg seatwork, on tests or 
quizzes, and on report writing. Although correlations were not high (I'S 
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range from .20 to .32), they do indicate some relation between aca-
demic performance and the regulation scales on the MSLQ. Scores on 
the strategy use and regulation scales of the MSLQ have been related, 
in theoretically predictable ways, to components of students' motiva-
tion including self-efficacy, task value, intrinsic motivation and test-
anxiety (Pintrich, 1989; Pintrich & De Groot, 1990; Pintrich & Garcia, 
1991; Pintrich, Roeser, & De Groot, 1994; Pintrich, Smith et al., 1993). 
Whereas the SRLIS has not been linked to performance on specific 
classroom tasks like the MSLQ, Zimmerman and Martinez-Pons (1986, 
1988) did find that students' responses to the SRLIS were related to 
teachers' ratings of students' efforts at regulation and to achievement 
on the Metropolitan Achievement Test. In short, positive efforts have 
been made to examine the expected relations between strategy use 
and regulation as measured by the MSLQ and the SRLIS and other 
constructs such as achievement, teachers' grades and ratings, and 
motivational constructs. Although the magnihlde of the relations is 
modest, the evidence indicates that scores on these instruments, at a 
minimum, can distinguish between high and low achievers in class-
room settings as predicted by our conceptual and theoretical models 
of self-regulated learning. 
Generality of Construct Meaning. The generalizability of an assess-
ment across different domains is an important aspect of construct 
validity. The MSLQ and the SRLIS have items that refer to distinct 
academic tasks and subject areas. Hence, results about students' 
ability to regulate their cognition may not be limited to a single 
domain as the case may be with instruments that reference only one 
domain (i.e., reading comprehension). 
As we have noted, the diversity and size of the samples used in 
the studies of these measures are important to consider when assess-
ing generality of construct meaning. Data for the MSLQ were initially 
collected with a fairly large number of college students (different 
samples of 326, 687, 758 and 380, for a total of over 2,000) from 
different types of institutions (research universities, comprehensive 
universities, small liberal arts colleges, and community colleges) 
spanning many different subject areas (see Pintrich, Smith et al., 1993). 
It has also been used extensively with middle school students (Pintrich 
& De Groot, 1990; Pintrich et al., 1994), but has not, to our knowledge, 
been used specifically to examine students below the seventh grade or 
special populations such as students with learning disabilities or 
gifted students. Self-report questionnaires may be difficult for younger 
children or those of lower achievement levels who may not be able to 
read the items on the questionnaire. Interviews or reading the 
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questionnaire items to students can help in this regard, but interviews 
may still be better with younger children. In terms of sampling issues, 
Zimmerman and Martinez-Pons (1988) used the SRLIS to examine 
metacognition and self-regulation in a relatively small sample (N = 80) 
of high and low track high school students. Clearly, as we have already 
noted for the measures of both metacognitive knowledge and monitor-
ing, there is a need for research on these control and regulation instru-
ments with more ethnically and racially diverse populations as well as 
students across a range of grade (age) and achievement levels. 
Relevance and Utility Concerns of Test Use. One reason for the 
difference in the samples sizes of studies using the MSLQ and those 
using the SRLIS is likely the relative ease of administration of the 
MSLQ. Self-report measures, as exemplified by the MSLQ, can have 
relatively high degrees of utility value for research studies or more 
practical uses because they can be completed quickly and easily by 
large numbers of students. In addition, they can be used by teachers 
or researchers in classroom settings without much disruption of 
routines. One or two individuals can administer the questionnaire to 
large numbers of students over a relatively short time frame and the 
data collected are fairly easily transferred to analyzable form. 
In comparison, even short interviews such as the SRLIS must be 
individually administered and therefore take substantially longer to 
complete. Further, the resulting data require a labor intensive effort 
to change into a usable format. Thus, one advantage to questionnaires 
such as the MSLQ or LASSI is that the researcher is able to collect a 
great deal of information quickly and easily. At the same time, open-
ended interviews like the SRLIS have an advantage in that they allow 
students more freedom to respond because they do not limit re-
sponses to particular strategies. This aspect of these interviews may 
increase the relevance that scores have for more diagnostic purposes. 
The interview data can provide a good window into the students' 
general schema for learning, a more "Gestalt" like view of their ap-
proach to learning and self-regulation that can get lost in the division of 
self-regulated learning into the multiple scales of the MSLQ. 
Summary. Both self-report questionnaires and interview methods 
can provide reasonable measures of control of learning and self-
regulated learning. First, these measures seem to provide good 
content representativeness of a number of different types of general 
strategies for control and regulation of learning, although they do not 
include domain-specific control and regulation strategies (e.g., a con-
trol strategy for math problem solving; a control strategy for writing 
an essay). Second, as noted in our discussion of measures of 
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metacognitive knowledge and monitoring, there are still major ques-
tions about the fit between the complex theoretical models (in terms 
of number of subcomponents) and the somewhat simple models 
supported by the empirical data. Third, the scoring systems are 
reasonable and easy to use, although there still remain questions 
concerning the use. of continuous measures of self-regulation versus 
categorical scoring systems based on a simple dichotomy of good and 
poor self-regulators or strategy users (see Pressley, Harris, & Marks, 
1992). Fourth, the major issue in terms of construct validity of self-
report questionnaires or interviews concerns their susceptibility to 
problems of construct-irrelevant variance stemming from differences 
in individuals' ability to consciously access their strategy use and 
control efforts, verbalize their strategy use, read the questionnaire 
items, or their susceptibility to social desirability or other forms of 
bias. Much work needs to be done to resolve these problems with 
self-report questionnaires and interviews. Fifth, as with all the 
measures there is a great need for the use of more diverse samples. 
Finally, questionnaires can be used easily and quickly with large 
groups of students in classroom situations and can be a very practical 
alternative to more experimental methods. Interviews can avoid 
some of the problems of questionnaires in terms of construct irrel-
evant variance by the judicious use of probes and focusing the student 
on specific tasks, but they are more time-consuming and costly to use. 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES 
Given our discussion of various measures of metacognition and 
self-regulated learning, there are a number of conclusions that can be 
drawn from our review of the evidence for the construct validity of 
these measures. These conclusions suggest several fruitful directions 
for research and development activities. 
1. There is no one "perfect" measure of metacognition. 
As we have seen throughout this chapter, there are a number of 
different measures and methods that have been used. Oftentimes the 
strength of one method is the weakness of another. Certain methods, 
such as think-aloud protocols, although potentially supplying "real-
time" measures of metacognition and self-regulated learning in given 
contexts are difficult to use on a large-scale basis. In contrast, self-report 
questiom1aires are high in applied utility, but are open to criticism 
regarding the potential for consh'uct-irrelevant variance to be generated 
by the self-reports. Individual researchers and practitioners must deter-
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mine what their purposes and needs are and then make informed 
choices about what measures to use given their own goals and the 
context in which they are workin,g. 
2. Different instruments measure different components of metacognition. 
Measures of metacognitive knowledge do not necessarily tap 
into aspects of monitoring or regulation. In fact, different measures 
of metacognitive judgment or monitoring do not even assess the 
same components of metacognitive monitoring and judgment. Con-
sequently individuals must be clear on which aspect they are inter-
ested in and choose instruments that match their interest because the 
measures cannot be used interchangeably. To facilitate this type of 
informed decision making, researchers and instrument developers 
need to be clear about which component of metacognition their 
instrument assesses and label their instrument accordingly. We have 
proposed a general three-component model of metacognition and 
self-regulated learning that includes a number of important subcom-
ponents. We think this model is grounded in current theory and 
research and should be helpful in clarifying which components of 
metacognition the various instruments are tapping. Instrument 
developers who use this three-component model of meta cognition 
and self-regulated learning and label their instruments in line with it 
will ensure some consistency in assessment use and facilitate cross-
study comparisons of empirical findings. 
3. Further specification of the theoretical relations among the different 
components of metacognition and self-regulated learning would be helpful 
for instrument development. 
As has been noted throughout this chapter, there is a disjunction 
between our theoretical models and the empirical data, particularly 
with respect to monitoring and regulation. Most models separate 
these two components and the separation makes sense intuitively 
and conceptually, but the empirical data argue against a separation. 
This is the problem of "grain size" and instrument resolution (see 
Howard-Rose & Winne, 1993). For some purposes, a general distinc-
tion between high and low lev~ls of self-regulation (Zimmerman & 
Martinez-Pons, 1986, 1988), or good and poor strategy users (Pressley 
et aI, 1992), or more or less cognitive engagement (Pintrich & 
Schrauben, 1992) can be fruitful. In other contexts and given other 
research goals, there is a need for more fine-grained analysis of the 
component and subcomponent processes. Theoretical and empirical 
work on these issues will clarify our models and help us develop 
more conceptually sound and useful instruments. 
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4. Construct validity studies are needed to test our theoretical models 
and the validity of our assessment instruments. 
Given that metacognition and self-regulated learning include a 
number of different components and that there are a number of 
different methods that can be used to assess these components, there 
is a need for careful and well-designed construct validity studies. For 
example, multi trait, multimethod (MTMM) studies can be used to 
clarify our theoretical models as well as provide us with useful 
information about our instruments. The recent MTMM study by 
Howard-Rose and Winne (1993) on self-regulated learning demon-
strates how a MTMM study can help to clarify our conceptual models 
as well as suggest how best to measure different components of 
metacognition and self-regulated learning. There have been very few 
carefully done studies like this in the area of metacognitton and self-
regulation and more MTMM studies would certainly benefit the field. 
At the same time, we can go beyond the correlational analyses of 
MTMM studies and examine the different factors that contribute to 
the variance of our measurement instruments through the use of 
generalizability studies. For example, generalizability studies (see 
Baxter & Shavelson, 1994; Gao et al., 1996) can provide data on the 
comparability of different tasks and methods for assessing the differ-
ent components of metacognition and self-regulation. 
5. One of the most problematic issues from both theoretical and 
measurement perspectives is the domain specificity vs. generality issue. 
Metacognition and self-regulated learning are generally mea-
sured with respect to one domain such as reading comprehension, 
but they are often considered domain-general constructs that transfer 
or generalize across domains. For example, it is often assumed that 
students who are high in meta cognitive monitoring or general self-
regulation for one task will also be able to transfer these skills to 
another task or domain. In terms of content representativeness, 
many of our measures have focused on the content areas of memory 
or reading comprehension. There is a need for more research and 
development in other academic areas such as mathematics, science, 
and social studies. In addition, in our measures of metacognition and 
self-regulated learning, we need to address how individual scores on 
our instrument generalize or transfer across domains (see Schraw et 
al., 1995). Our theoretical models have not always been clear con-
cerning how transfer is assumed to occur across situations, tasks, or 
domains, so it is not surprising that our measurement efforts have 
been less than successful in coping with this issue. The issue of 
domain specificity and transfer may be the largest and most intrac-
table problem confronting our theoretical and assessment efforts. 
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6. The use of performance assessments may help us measure both 
knowledge and metacognition within and across domains. 
Recent developments in the use of performance assessments may 
help us resolve the tension between knowledge-based or domain-
specific models of learning and cognition that focus on students' prior 
knowledge and more domain-general models that stress the role of 
metacognition and self-regulated learning. For example, Baxter, 
Elder, and Glaser (1994, 1996), have examined performance assess-
ments designed to provide measures of students' knowledge in 
science domains (life science, physical science). These performance 
assessments use tasks that are meaningful and relevant to students and 
are typically used in classroom settings to monitor instruction. Inter-
views of students while carrying out the assessment provided evidence 
of general monitoring and regulation strategies. Moreover, students 
who performed well on the science assessment displayed more frequent 
and flexible monitoring strategies than did students who performed less 
well. Research that attempts to examine the use of metacognitive 
strategies in everyday classroom contexts and how these strategies 
relate to performance within and across tasks sheds important light on 
our lmderstanding of metacognition and suggests how insh·uctional 
changes might be implemented to enhance learning in the classroom. 
7. There is a need for longitudinal research across ages. 
Cross-sectional studies of different aged students show that 
metacognition develops with age and experience, but we have rela-
tively few studies that show metacognitive development within indi-
viduals. We need studies to test the theory that children first develop 
domain-specific metacognitive knowledge or strategies, followed by 
a more generalized transfer of these strategies to a number of domains 
(see Schraw et al., 1995). Moreover, these kinds of studies can guide 
instrument development and perhaps lead to different types of mea-
sures being used at different ages. 
8. There is a need for research with diverse populations. 
Obviously, as we have pointed out throughout this chapter, there is 
a need for more research and test development activities that include 
diverse ethnic and racial groups. Although most models of metacognition 
should be applicable to all groups of individuals, there is some evidence 
that different groups of students may make judgments about them-
selves in somewhat different ways. Graham (1994) points out that many 
African-American students' perceptions of their learning and confi-
delKe in their ability are not highly correlated with their actual achieve-
ment scores or performance. As we have discussed in this paper, this is 
a problem in the calibration of monitoring judgments and actual perfor-
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mance. Graham (1994) notes U1at it is not clear theoretically why fuis 
may be the case, but there have been suggestions that fuis is an adaptive 
coping strategy given U1at many of these students have generally low 
academic performance. If this explanation is correct, U1en it suggests 
that for these students, they may be making poor judgments of their 
learning and understanding in order to maintain their motivation and 
self-beliefs. However, fuis poor calibration can have detrimental effects 
on the use of regulating strategies. If the students believe that U1ey are 
learning, when they are not, then they will be unlikely to change or 
effectively regulate their cognition and learning. 
This type of dynamic is not addressed in most of the research on 
metacognitive monitoring and self-regulated learning and we need 
to test our models with diverse groups of students to determine if 
there are different processes involved for some of these groups. To 
the extent that there are different processes for these groups, and our 
normative models of metacognition and self-regulated learning do 
not include these processes, then this can result in instruments that 
suffer from construct underrepresentation of these different pro-
cesses for diverse groups. Alternatively, our current models and 
instruments may suffer from problems of construct-irrelevant vari-
ance if these different groups respond to our instruments in a 
different manner than what is predicted by our normative models. 
In summary, our models and instruments are developed to the 
point that they are useful for field work and the improvement of 
practic~ . At the same time, there is much theoretical and empirical 
work to be done in the area of metacognition and self-regulation to 
clarify our models and substantiate the "adequacy and appropriate-
ness of inferences and actions based on test scores" (Messick, 1989, p. 
13). We hope that the discussion in this chapter will stimulate 
researchers in the field to continue to question their instruments in an 
effort to improve our assessment methods and build our understand-
ing of the nature of metacognition and self-regulation. 
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